{"id":20572,"date":"2018-10-15T08:36:28","date_gmt":"2018-10-15T05:36:28","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.onisilos.gr\/?p=20572"},"modified":"2018-10-14T08:37:38","modified_gmt":"2018-10-14T05:37:38","slug":"russias-new-maritime-doctrine-and-issues-with-the-surface-fleet","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.onisilos.gr\/?p=20572","title":{"rendered":"RUSSIA\u2019S NEW MARITIME DOCTRINE AND ISSUES WITH THE SURFACE FLEET"},"content":{"rendered":"

This analysis considers the changes in the maritime doctrine of the Russian Federation and the difficulties for the Russian surface fleet in implementing this doctrine.\u00a0The analysis is made by SouthFront Team<\/b> under the general editorship of Daniel Deiss<\/b>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Maritime doctrine of the Russian Federation to the year 2030. Requirements and priorities<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n

Current changes to the global geopolitical map are being fueled by struggles between world powers for control over strategically important logistical communications, corridors, staging areas, and potential markets. One important arena of this struggle are the planet\u2019s oceans, and the key competitors are the United States, China, and Russia. These state actors are reassessing the competition, rethinking military doctrines, and establishing new responsibilities for their armed forces. Of special importance is the development of naval capabilities equal to the tasks set before them. Each of the three main competing powers have their own aims which come from their specific geopolitical position, economic potential, and unique considerations of national security and cultural strategy. In the last several years following Russia\u2019s return to the world stage as a power to be reckoned with, Moscow has significantly revised its approach to challenges and threats. As part of this work on new strategic plans detailing the character of Russia\u2019s naval presence on the high seas, the maritime doctrine was updated and then approved on July twentieth, 2017. The main threat to Russia was identified as \u201cthe efforts of a number of states, primarily the United State of America and its allies, to dominate the oceans, including the Arctic, and to establish overwhelming naval superiority.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

The Atlantic is of special interest to Russia due to the increasing economic, political, and military pressure from NATO countries and the consequent sharp reduction in Russia\u2019s capacity to project power in the region. Additionally, Russia\u2019s political and military leadership are striving to strengthen the armed forces in the strategically important Mediterranean and Black seas, which also have repercussions on the Atlantic.<\/span><\/p>\n

The main priorities of naval policies in the Arctic region are to maintain the Russian fleet\u2019s access to the Atlantic as well as to safeguard exclusive access to the rich natural resources of the continental shelf. The Northern fleet plays a vital role in defense of the state and continued, unhindered economic development.<\/span><\/p>\n

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The importance of the Pacific for the Russian Federation is also huge and continues to grow. The Russian Far East sits on enormous resources but is sparsely populated and largely isolated from the industrially developed regions of the country. This situation is aggravated by the intense economic and military development of neighboring states in the Asia-Pacific region, which has a strong influence on economic, demographic, and other processes in the region.<\/span><\/p>\n

One area previously ignored in the maritime doctrine but which was included in the revised version devotes attention to Russia\u2019s shipbuilding capacity. The inclusion of this section in the doctrine is due to the critical situation of the naval construction industry and the physical state of the military and commercial fleet. For example, the doctrine estimates that in order to maintain a shipping volume of 1129 million tons, it will be necessary to build 1470 cargo ships with deadweight of 22.9 million tons. Furthermore, 1069 vessels will need to be scrapped and replaced due to aging, and 401 vessels will need to be built in addition to that which exists today.<\/span><\/p>\n

The doctrine describes how the ability of Russia to effectively react to challenges and threats requires a significant strengthening of the navy and a presence on the oceans.<\/span><\/p>\n

In order to defend its interests, the navy requires a minimum of two full-fledged aircraft carriers \u2013 one in the Arctic and the second in the Mediterranean. This says nothing of the large number of surface vessels which could be needed for other sea zones. The deployment of an aircraft carrier in the Pacific would only be possible in the distant future. So far, it appears that surface groups deployed in distant sea zones are being folded back into existing groups closer to home.<\/span><\/p>\n

The new doctrine emphasizes the capabilities of naval aviation in relation to nuclear strategy. Without air cover to deal with the likely superiority of enemy anti-submarine aviation, it is impossible to guarantee not only combat readiness but also the deployment of submarines with their ballistic missile payloads which form the main nuclear strike capability of the Russian navy. Missile-carrying vessels and shore-based surveillance aviation as well as anti-submarine aviation would be unable to successfully go into action without fighter cover. Fighter cover is necessary for the combat efficiency of large ships. In turn, surface vessels make possible the deployment and safe return of submarines from combat areas as well as the movement and deployment of paratroopers. The surface fleet plays the defining role in building mine fields as well as mine-clearing operations. The traditional uses for surface vessels include launching strikes on enemy objects within their own territory, defending shorelines from enemy naval forces, and engaging in anti-submarine operations. In these ways, surface vessels perform a number of critical functions on the battlefield. They can carry out these functions independently, in groups, or in coordination with other naval forces like submarines, carrier-born aviation, and the marines.<\/span><\/p>\n

Due to the important role played by the navy in Russian power projection, the navy and the surface fleet in particular are faced with many critical challenges which must be addressed today or in the nearest future.<\/span><\/p>\n

While the Russian air force and submarine fleet are equipped to meet their particular challenges, the surface fleet finds itself in a complex and even paradoxical situation. In order to analyze the condition of the surface fleet, it is necessary to survey the current line of surface vessels as well as the construction and modernization plans which are part of the government\u2019s rearmament strategy.<\/span><\/p>\n

Current state and capabilities of the Russian surface fleet<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n

Project 1143.5 heavy aircraft-carrying missile cruiser \u201cAdmiral of the fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov\u201d<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n

Russia\u2019s only ship of this type. Tasked with the destruction\u00a0 of large surface targets and defense of naval assets from attack by enemy carrier-born units and submarines.<\/span><\/p>\n