20\/10\/2021 Written by Konstantinos Apostolou-Katsaros<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n In the wake of the AUKUS agreement, EU member states must come to terms with the loss of primacy and the shift of the U.S.\u2019s geostrategic center of gravity to the East to counter Chinese expansionism. The old Eurocentric western security architecture is essentially in shambles, hindering\u00a0NATO\u2019s integrity<\/a>\u00a0as well. The emerging\u00a0alliance<\/a>\u00a0between the U.S., U.K., Australia, India, and Japan diminishes NATO\u2019s importance in the Indo-Pacific. The French and other traditional allies and partners\u2014members of EU and NATO\u2014collectively appeared more enraged than China, highlighting the clumsy formation of AUKUS that was accelerated by the Afghanistan withdrawal debacle. AUKUS marks a turning point in global geopolitics that will have a domino effect on several parts of the world\u2014one being the Eastern Mediterranean.<\/span><\/p>\n After the diplomatic blow of AUKUS and Angela Merkel\u2019s retirement from frontline politics, France\u2019s first reaction was to strengthen its ties with Greece and increase its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean by signing a rearmament\u00a0deal<\/a>\u00a0that modernizes the Hellenic Navy and commits to an important Defense Assistance Agreement.\u00a0The latter includes a clause of mutual defense assistance\u2014similar to the mutual defense clause (Article 42.7 TEU<\/a>) of the Treaty of the European Union\u2014in case one of the two states is attacked on its\u00a0territory<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n Analysts note a\u00a0relation<\/a>\u00a0between AUKUS and U.S. support for France to pursue a more\u00a0proactive role<\/a>\u00a0in the Eastern Mediterranean through the game-changing Franco-Greek deal that bolsters the Greek armed forces with three Belharra frigates (+1 option). Athens previously ordered 18 Rafale fighter jets and has plans to acquire six more in the future.<\/span><\/p>\n France already showed its intention to\u00a0support<\/a>\u00a0Greece against Turkey during a prolonged 82-day crisis that brought Greece and Turkey (two historic rivals and NATO members) to the brink of conflict. Back in 2020, the Turks deployed their seismic research vessel Oru\u00e7 Reis accompanied by a flotilla of warships to conduct surveys on the Greek continental shelf (as described in United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea \u2013\u00a0UNCLOS III<\/a>) that Turkey claims with the unsubstantiated Mavi Vatan (Blue Homeland) naval doctrine. The Mavi Vatan opposes UNCLOS III provisions and is based on the arbitrary assumption that all islands are deprived of the right to exert jurisdiction on the continental shelf. However, the Law of the Sea is binding on all states to the extent that it represents customary international law, and although Turkey is not a signatory to it, it has to comply with it.<\/span><\/p>\n French President Emmanuel Macron openly criticizing Turkey\u2019s activity on the Greek and Cypriot continental shelf\/exclusive economic zone (EEZ)\u00a0said<\/a>,\u00a0\u201cI don\u2019t consider that in recent years Turkey\u2019s strategy is the strategy of a NATO ally\u2026 when you have a country which attacks the exclusive economic zones or the sovereignty of two members of the European Union.\u201d In contrast, on another occasion, he\u00a0clarified<\/a>\u00a0that \u201cFrance has been very clear. When there were unilateral acts in the eastern Mediterranean, we condemned them with words, and we acted by sending frigates.\u201d After signing the Franco-Greek deal in \u00c9lys\u00e9e Palace, he also\u00a0noted<\/a>\u00a0that \u201cit will help protect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity of both states.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n Competing EEZ claims in the Eastern Mediterranean (Source: gisreportsonline.com)<\/span><\/p>\n \n The Turks, as expected, expressed their frustration with the newly formed Franco-Greek strategic alliance by putting pressure on Greece and the Republic of Cyprus. Turkish frigates\u00a0obstructed<\/a>\u00a0the Maltese-flagged research vessel Nautical Geo hired to conduct research related to the EastMed gas pipeline. The ship attempted to work on the Greek continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone (delimitated<\/a>\u00a0with Egypt) and Cypriot EEZ (delimitated<\/a>\u00a0with Egypt). Turkey, however, is\u00a0claiming<\/a>\u00a0the same continental self with the Mavi Vatan doctrine.<\/span><\/p>\n With an increased military presence, the Turks aimed and succeeded in forcing the Americans on yet another equidistance statement. A State Department spokesman\u00a0said<\/a>\u00a0the U.S. \u201cencourages all states to resolve maritime delimitation issues through peaceful dialogue and in accordance with international law,\u201d an announcement that overlooks the fact that the Turkish frigate obstructed Nautical Geo\u2019s work on Greek and Cypriot delineated EEZs.<\/span><\/p>\n Natural gas infrastructure in the Eastern Mediterranean.<\/span><\/p>\n \n Ankara fueled tensions to test the Franco-Greek alliance\u2019s credibility and the commitment of the states involved in EastMed. In an older statement, the Turkish Ambassador to Athens Burak \u00d6z\u00fcgergin\u00a0said<\/a>\u00a0that \u201cthe cause of our troubles [between Greece and Turkey] is Cyprus and the\u00a0trilateral agreement<\/a>\u00a0[Greece-Republic of Cyprus-Israel] on EastMed.\u201d On the other hand, the Israeli Ambassador to Athens, Yossi Amrani, made an ambiguous\u00a0statement<\/a>\u00a0about the pipeline clarifying that \u201cif we do not do it now, it will not be realistic later.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n The Americans also expressed skepticism over the feasibility and construction costs of the pipeline. \u201cWe basically support the concept of a pipeline \u2013 it\u2019s very appealing. The question is whether it is economically viable,\u201d an American official\u00a0stated<\/a>. \u201cIf the pipeline makes the gas too expensive on the European market right now, obviously that should be considered,\u201d he added.\u00a0 These reservations fell into silence after Israeli interventions.<\/span><\/p>\n The EastMed pipeline has always faced issues with the gas\u00a0deposits needed<\/a>\u00a0to support it. The Israeli-Egyptian\u00a0agreement<\/a>\u00a0on the construction of a subsea gas pipeline from the Israeli Leviathan gas field (initially intended to be supplied through EastMed) to liquefaction facilities in Egypt and similar\u00a0plans<\/a>\u00a0to transfer sizable quantities of gas from Aphrodite Cypriot gas field (also designed to be supplied through EastMed) to Egypt, raise further doubts on the project.<\/span><\/p>\n Dr. Charles Ellinas, a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council\u2019s Global Energy Center,\u00a0counters<\/a>\u00a0that \u201cdue to limited amount of gas at Leviathan, it is not feasible for other pipelines from Israel to Egypt to coexist with EastMed.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n Regardless of the potential shortcomings of EastMed, it yields a unique opportunity to assess the new Franco-Greek alliance. Utilizing the proposed pipeline may prove a valuable tool to contain the Mavi Vatan revisionist doctrine. Whether EastMed is techno-economically doable or not is irrespective of the need to defend it on site. This relates to Greece\u2019s right to unilaterally extend its territorial waters from 6 to 12Nm (in compliance with\u00a0UNCLOS III<\/a>\u00a0provisions) as well as exercising its sovereignty rights and jurisdiction over the\u00a0continental shelf<\/a>\/EEZ<\/a>\u00a0that Turkey provocatively challenges.<\/span><\/p>\n From France\u2019s point of view, defending Greece\u2019s rights (interrelated with those of the Republic of Cyprus) deriving from the Law of the Sea serves its long-term geostrategic goal for Mediterranean naval supremacy and control.<\/span><\/p>\n Joint Franco-Greek action to defend EastMed\u2019s ongoing works would voice a clear message to Turkey. On the contrary, leaving the Turkish offensive obstruction of Nautical Geo \u2013or similar future actions\u2013 unanswered would diminish the Franco-Greek pact credibility forged in common rivalry with Turkey. Moreover, the new strategic deal can act as a pretext to adopt a much-needed confrontational approach against Turkish revisionism and neo-imperial tendencies that are known to give attention to strong measures rather than soft diplomatic approaches.<\/span><\/p>\n In any case, the security situation in the region is rapidly deteriorating. \u00d6mer \u00c7elik (spokesperson of Recep Tayyip Erdo\u011fan\u2019s AK Party)\u00a0stated<\/a>\u00a0on October 5, 2021, that the Mavi Vatan doctrine is Turkey\u2019s \u201cred line.\u201d Days later, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevl\u00fct \u00c7avu\u015fo\u011flu picked up the glove on the Franco-Greek alliance and increased the heat on Mediterranean waters\u00a0announcing<\/a>\u00a0that Ankara could declare Turkey\u2019s EEZ. Question is how will the Greeks and French react to Turkish efforts to undermine the newly formed alliance?<\/span><\/p>\n
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